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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(j) and the Supreme Court's transfer order of May 15, 2006. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. In a case arising from an intra-family dispute involving closely-held 
limited partnerships, was it erroneous to grant summary judgment when: 
a) the district court based its conclusion on a finding that all the 
claims asserted were derivative (i) despite evidence that Plaintiff was 
uniquely harmed; and (ii) despite the judicial dissolution/accounting requests 
made by Plaintiff; and 
b) the court refused to invoke an exception allowing limited 
partners to pursue derivative claims in closely-held partnerships. 
2. Did the district court err in refusing to reconsider its summary 
judgment decision to allow Plaintiffs judicial dissolution claim to go forward 
when such a claim is, by definition, not derivative? 
3. Did the district court err in declaring Plaintiff s motion to amend 
"moot" when Plaintiff sought to allege futility of demand so it could proceed with 
its claims derivatively? 
1 
Standard of Review 
Because all these matters were decided in the context of summary judgment, 
review is de novo, with no deference given to the district court's legal 
interpretation. See, e.g., State v. Straight, 2004 UT 88, f 5, 108 P.3d 690 (Utah 
2004). All of the foregoing issues were addressed by the district court's summary 
judgment orders, R. at 432-38; 578-80, and thus are preserved for review. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 48-2a-1003: 
In a derivative action, the complaint shall set forth with particularity the 
effort of the plaintiff to secure initiation of the action by a general partner or 
the reasons for not making the effort. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
This case arises from an intra-family dispute involving closely-held limited 
partnerships. Merline Learning is the majority owner of Plaintiff GLFP1, which is 
an equal owner (along with an entity controlled by Ms. Learning's brother, 
Defendant Howard Clark) of Defendant Clark Learning Properties. R. at 265. 
1
 GLFP was established initially as a limited partnership, and was so classified in 
the Complaint. However, it was converted to a limited liability company on 
July 28, 2004. This conversion did not alter Merline Learning's status as the 
primary owner. The Court granted summaiy judgment before Plaintiff could 
correct the case caption to reflect that GLFP had been converted to a limited 
liability company. See R. at 253, 265. 
2 
Howard Clark is the managing partner of Defendant CL Management, Ltd. which 
in turn is the managing partner of Clark Learning Properties, Ltd. Id. The 
remaining defendant below, H. Scott Clark, is the son of Howard Clark. 
GLFP filed suit against Clark Learning Properties, CL Management and the 
Clarks, as individuals, in the Third Judicial District Court on February 8, 2005. R. 
1. GLFP asserted claims for (a) damages for breach of fiduciary duty against the 
Clarks and CL Management, (b) dissolution of both CL Management and Clark 
Learning Properties, and (c) an accounting in conjunction with dissolution. R. at 5-
6. 
After limited discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment on 
July 20, 2005, arguing that all of GLFP's claims were derivative, and that GLFP 
had not complied with Utah Code Annotated §§ 48-2a-1001 to 1006, which govern 
derivative actions. R. at 192. On August 15, 2005, Defendants filed a separate 
motion for summary judgment asserting that GLFP lacked standing or capacity to 
bring its claims because it purportedly had assigned its interests in Clark Learning 
Properties and CL Management to two different entities. R. at 279-80. 
On November 7, 2005, Judge Iwasaki issued his summary judgment 
decision, finding a question of fact concerning the assignment issue, R. at 434,2 but 
holding in Defendants' favor with respect to the derivative nature of Plaintiff s 
2
 Given the district court's finding, the assignment question is not an issue in this 
appeal. 
3 
claims, id. at 436. However, Judge Iwasaki did not enter judgment in favor of 
Defendants at that time. On November 14, GLFP promptly moved for 
reconsideration of the summary judgment decision with respect to its judicial 
dissolution claim, R. at 467, and also sought leave to amend its Complaint to assert 
its other claims on a derivative basis, R. at 439-41. On April 5, 2006, Judge 
Iwasaki denied the motion to reconsider, declared the motion to amend "moot," 
and entered final judgment in favor of Defendants. R. at 575-76; 581-82. GLFP 
timely filed a Notice of Appeal on May 5, 2006. R. at 590-91. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
The issues in this case arise from the extended and often contentious 
business dealings between Ms. Learning and her brother, Mr. Clark, and their 
respective families. The Learnings and Clairks have been business partners in a 
variety of entities for many years. 
Defendant CL Management, Ltd. ("CL Mgmt") is a Utah limited partnership 
established in 1983, with Mr. Clark as the managing general partner, R. at 265 
although plaintiff alleged that Mr. Clark assigned or delegated most of his 
responsibilities and duties to his son, H. Scott Clark. R. at 2. Defendant Clark 
Learning Properties, Ltd. ("CLP") is a Utah limited partnership established in 
1988. Its primary business is ownership of various real estate interests. R. at 265. 
CL Mgmt is the managing general partner of CLP. As a result, the Clarks 
4 
effectively function as general partners of CLP, as well. Id. CL Mgmt owns 10% 
of CLP. Id. The remaining 90% is owned equally by the Learning family through 
Plaintiff GLFP (short for "George Learning Family Partnership") and the Clarks, 
through an entity called HCFP (the "Howard Clark Family Partnership"). R. at 
264-65. 
CL Mgmt's primary business is to manage and operate various real estate 
holdings, including those of CLP. R. at 265. In addition to CLP, CL Mgmt is the 
managing general partner of at least two other Clark/Learning entities - CL 
Investment Company and Modulus Investment Company. Id. The Clarks also 
have other properties and businesses for their sole benefit, which are also managed 
by CL Mgmt. R. at 265-66. Although members of the Learning family have 
ownership interests in CL Investment and Modulus, GLFP is not an owner of 
CL Investment, Modulus, or any of the other entities operated by the Clarks for 
their sole benefit. 
For all essential purposes, CL Mgmt is owned equally by the Clark and 
Learning families, who fund CL Mgmt primarily via various fees charged by the 
Clarks for the management of the families' holdings, including: (a) property 
management fees; (b) asset management fees; and (c) leasing fees. R. at 265. 
CL Mgmt's overhead and expenses, in theory, should be shared equally by the 
Learning and Clark families. Id. Accordingly, each family has traditionally paid 
5 
equal amounts (e.g., via CLP) for the administration and overhead of CL Mgmt 
and should receive equal distributions (e.g., to GLFP and HCFP). (See Exhibit 1 
of the addendum which is a chart based on the foregoing facts and is helpful in 
defining the various companies and ownership interests.) 
In its Complaint, GLFP alleged that many of the fees assessed by CL Mgmt 
were excessive. R. at 4. In response to inquiries by the Learnings, the Clarks had 
stated that the fees charged were not excessive, but in any event, equally benefited 
the Clarks and Learnings because of their joint ownership status in CL Mgmt. Id. 
However, since the Clarks commingled the activities of numerous properties and 
interests - in which the Learnings have no ownership, but the Clarks do - within 
the business of CL Mgmt, the Clarks used the improper fees to help fund their own 
interests, to the detriment of GLFP specifically, and thereby the Learnings 
generally. Id. In other words, because of CL Mgmt's involvement with entities 
that benefit the Clarks alone, and not the Learnings, the Learnings have been 
paying for a disproportionate share of expenses, and more importantly, receiving 
less in distributions to GLFP, thereby effectively subsidizing the management of 
properties and businesses from which they derive no benefit. This fact was the 
genesis of the lawsuit, and a key aspect of Plaintiff s Complaint. R. at 4-5. This 
fact also was fundamentally misunderstood by the district court. 
6 
In their summary judgment pleadings, Defendants argued that GLFP was not 
charged any of the excessive fees by CL Management, which instead were directly 
charged to CLP. R. at 209. Thus, Defendants argued that GLFP's alleged claims 
were derivative (i.e., belonged to CLP) in that only CLP was directly harmed by 
the fees. R. at 194-95. In opposition, GLFP asserted that the Clarks had 
commingled the activities of numerous properties and interests and, in doing so, 
had used the improper fees to help fund their own interests, to the direct detriment 
of GLFP by way of reduced distributions. R. at 255-56,265-66. Thus, the direct 
harm to GLFP was that, contrary to the Clarks' representations, the excessive fees 
did not equally benefit the Clarks and GLFP via distributions from CL Mgmt; 
adequate distributions did not take place because of the commingling and use of 
the fees to benefit the Clarks' separate business entities. R. at 256, 258. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court wrongly classified all of plaintiff s claims as derivative, 
ignoring both the unique harm suffered by GLFP and the non-derivative nature of 
claims for judicial dissolution. Alternatively, the district court ignored Supreme 
Court case law recognizing an exception to derivative-claim requirements when a 
limited partner challenges the actions of a general partner in a closely-held 
partnership. 
7 
The district court also erred in refusing to reconsider its decision to allow 
plaintiff to proceed on its dissolution claim, which was not based solely on 
excessive fees. Further, refusal to reconsider did not render plaintiffs motion to 
amend moot. Plaintiff should have been allowed to assert futility of demand, and 
pursue those claims classified by the district court as derivative. 
ARGUMENT 
I. GLFP ASSERTED DIRECT, NON-DERIVATIVE CLAIMS AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS. 
The district court's initial summary judgment order largely consists of a 
synopsis of the parties' respective positions. R. at 434-36. No case law is cited. 
The court's reasoning is set forth in two sentences: 
[Although GLFP may ultimately experience the indirect 
effect of the alleged wrongdoing, the undisputed 
evidence indicates that the only direct claims are held by 
the Partnership. Moreover, since this action has not been 
brought as a derivative one, Plaintiffs claim for an 
accounting and for dissolution lack any basis. 
R. at 436. 
A. GLFP's Damage Claim Was Direct, Not Derivative. 
Contrary to the district court's decision, GLFP's damage claims against CL 
Mgmt and the Clarks (based on breach of fiduciary duty) were for injuries uniquely 
suffered by it, and not by CLP. By definition, such claims are not derivative. 
In shareholder litigation, which is directly analogous to actions by limited 
partners, Utah defines derivative claims as follows: 
8 
A derivative action must necessarily be based on a claim 
for relief which is owned by the stockholder's 
corporation . . . . The stockholder, as a nominal party, 
has no right, title or interest whatsoever in the claim itself 
- whether the action is brought by the corporation or by 
the stockholder on behalf of the corporation. 
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 638 (Utah 1980). In contrast to 
derivative claims, to maintain a direct action a shareholder "need show only an 
injury to him or herself that is distinct from that suffered by the corporation." 
Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 
1280 (Utah 1999) (citing PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 7.01, cmt. C) (hereafter, "PRINCIPLES")). 
If GLFP's claim was only that CL Mgmt had charged CLP excessive fees, to 
the equal detriment of the Clarks/HCFP and Leamings/GLFP as owners of CLP, 
the resulting legal claims could be classified as derivative and belonging to CLP. 
But the excessive fees were merely a starting point, and not the lynchpin, of the 
Complaint. As noted, the wrongful conduct at issue was the commingling and 
misdirection of the excessive fees by CL Mgmt for the benefit of other Clark 
entities and properties, with the result that GLFP received less distributions than 
would otherwise have been true, and the Clarks received a benefit that GLFP did 
not. (See addendum, Exhibit 2, for a chart depicting these facts.) The district 
court's summary judgment order did nothing to analyze this issue, but merely held 
in a conclusory fashion that the claims were derivative. R. at 436. Indeed, the 
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district court does nothing to explain why commingling and misdirection of assets 
by a general partner is not direct harm to a limited partner. 
GLFP did not merely rely on the allegations in its Complaint on this issue. 
Despite having had only limited discovery, GLFP retained an expert to analyze 
Defendants' documents and records. His initial report revealed that the excessive 
fees disproportionately benefited the Clarks and their businesses to the detriment of 
GLFP. R. at 272-73. The district court's decision makes no mention of this report. 
Defendants did not cite a single case holding that commingling and 
misdirection of assets by a general partner is not directly harmful to the limited 
partner that is denied the benefit of those assets. Defendants' focus was on where 
the funds originated - i.e., from CLP's payment of excessive fees - and not on 
where the fees went once received by CL Mgmt. The injury was unique to GLFP 
because the other primary owners of CL Mgmt were either a Clark entity (HCFP) 
or Howard Clark himself, who were receiving the benefits of the commingling and 
misdirection of assets. 
B. GLFP's Requests for Dissolution and An Accounting Were Not 
Derivative Claims. 
Just as importantly, the district court failed to analyze GLFP's requests for 
an accounting and judicial dissolution. Defendants failed to cite any law holding 
that actions for an accounting and dissolution are derivative; indeed, such actions 
are classically brought directly by a minority owner. See, e.g., Stewart v. K&S 
10 
Co., 591 P.2d 433 (Utah 1979) (individual shareholder brought direct action for 
accounting); Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129 (Utah App. 1989) (a limited partner 
brought direct action for dissolution of a limited partnership). Again, the district 
court's holding began and ended with the issue of excessive fees, and failed to 
distinguish these claims by GLFP from its request for damages. In the district 
court's view (implicit, but not directly stated), a limited partner may not seek 
dissolution based on a harm suffered by the partnership at the hands of the general 
partner. No case law was cited for this proposition. 
GLFP moved for partial reconsideration of the initial summary judgment 
decision, arguing both that a claim for dissolution is not derivative, and that this 
claim was not based solely on the excessive fees charged to CLP. See, e.g., UTAH 
CODE ANN. 48-2a-802; Kalabogias v. Georgou, 627 NE 2d 51, 57 (111. App. 1993); 
12B FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5915.20 at 478-79 (2000) ("An 
action which has for its purpose compelling the directors to dissolve a corporation 
is representative in character, since the right to determine whether a corporation 
shall be dissolved resides in the majority of the shareholders and not in the 
corporation itself."). In contrast, by their nature derivative actions are brought to 
maintain the continued and profitable existence of a partnership. 
Minority shareholders may sue a company directly for its dissolution when 
they can establish that those in control have acted in a manner that is oppressive, 
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illegal, or fraudulent. Kalabogias, 627 NE.2d at 53. A limited partner has the 
right to seek dissolution upon a showing of oppressive conduct which has the 
effect of excluding that partner from taking part in the affairs of the partnership. 
See, e.g., Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 285 NE 2d 574, 581 (111. 1972) 
(holding that there was ample evidence showing a record of arbitrary, overbearing, 
and heavy-handed conduct to justify finding of oppression and thereby supporting 
dissolution); White v. Perkins, 189 SE 2d 315, 318-19 (Va. 1972) (finding 
oppressive conduct where the majority shareholder/officer had excluded other 
shareholders from participating in the affairs of the company and had used the 
company for his own benefit). 
GLFP's Complaint alleged that Defendants had failed to hold timely, 
regular, and proper partnership meetings and failed to provide adequate financial 
and business documents. R, at 3-4. In fact, the Learnings often had to request 
partnership meetings in order to obtain financial and business information. Id. 
Despite these requests, meetings were held so sporadically and access to financial 
information had been so limited that GLFP was unable to track revenues and 
expenses to compare with the fees and distributions. Id. Likewise, the Complaint 
alleged that no partnership meeting of CLP had been held since September 15, 
2004 (nearly 6 months at the time the complaint was filed) and at the time of that 
September meeting, financial records were not up-to-date and agenda items were 
12 
ignored or glossed over. Id. GLFP further alleged that minutes of meetings, when 
and if distributed, did not accurately reflect what had occurred. Id. In essence, 
GLFP and the Learnings had been excluded not only from participating in CLP and 
CL Mgmt, but from being able to effectively monitor and evaluate the activities of 
these businesses. 
In the briefing on its motion to reconsider, GLFP submitted an affidavit from 
Merline Learning indicating that the problems alleged in GLFP's initial Complaint 
had not been resolved. R. at 562-63. Ms. Learning had not been notified of a CLP 
partnership meeting in 2005 and had not received minutes of any such meeting. R. 
at 563. Further, GLFP had not received any distributions from CL Mgmt or CLP 
since April 2005, despite a large accumulation of cash. Id. Under Utah's Revised 
Limited Partnership Act, § 48-2a-802, judicial dissolution is allowed when a 
partnership is not reasonably able to carry on business in conformity with the 
partnership agreement or there is a failure to comply with the requirements of 
§§ 48-2a-101 etseq. GLFP's initial claim for dissolution specifically cited the 
failure of both CL Mgmt and CLP to comply with requirements of the Limited 
Partnership Act, particularly § 48-2a-305 (inspection of records - right to 
information), § 48-2a-503 (sharing of profits and losses), and § 48-2a-504 (sharing 
of distributions). R. at 3-4. 
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Having a second opportunity to address the issue, the district court again 
ignored these allegations and again focused on the allegation that excess fees were 
charged by CL Mgmt to CLP; as such, any claim based on the fees was derivative, 
according to the district court, and therefore all of Plaintiff s claims were 
derivative since they were all based on the same disputed conduct. R. at 575. This 
combination fact finding/legal conclusion was contrary to the record, and contrary 
to basic summary judgment standards. The district court thus erred, in the 
alternative, regarding GLFP's request for judicial dissolution and an accounting 
(the latter was requested as part of dissolution). Even if GLFP's damage claim was 
derivative, dismissal of the entire case was unwarranted. 
II. TO THE EXTENT GLFP'S CLAIMS ARE DEEMED DERIVATIVE, 
UTAH LAW PERMITS SUCH CLAIMS TO BE BROUGHT BY GLFP 
RATHER THAN VIA CLP. 
To the extent any of GLFP's claims could be considered to be derivative, 
Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment based on that finding alone. 
Instead, the district court should have addressed whether GLFP nonetheless should 
have been allowed to assert these claims. In fact, the cases Defendants cited to the 
district court were to this effect. In particular, Defendants relied upon Aurora 
Credit and Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 991 P.2d 584 (Utah 1999). Both 
of these cases recognize that, under some circumstances, shareholders in a closely-
held corporation (or limited partners in a closely-held limited partnership) may 
14 
bring claims directly which are by their nature derivative. Aurora, 970 P.2d at 
1280-81; Arndt, 991 P.2d 588-89. These two decisions essentially adopted the 
following recommendation of the American Law Institute: 
In the case of a closely-held corporation . . . , the court in 
its discretion may treat an action raising derivative claims 
as a direct action, exempt it from those restrictions and 
defenses applicable only to derivative actions, and order 
an individual recovery, if it finds that to do so will not 
(i) unfairly expose a corporation or defendants to a 
multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the 
interest of creditors of the corporation, or (iii) interfere 
with the fair distribution of the recovery among all 
interested persons. 
PRINCIPLES § 7.01(d).3 The PRINCIPLES thus recognize that, with limited 
exceptions, closely-held business entities should be treated differently with respect 
to derivative-claim requirements. Here, there was no showing by Defendants that 
any of the three exceptions applied; therefore, GLFP should have been allowed to 
pursue the asserted claims. 
The district court's response to GLFP's argument was to shift the summary 
judgment burden to the non-moving party, i.e., GLFP. The district court stated that 
"the evidence in the record simply does not support such an exception and, further, 
no proper Rule 56(f) motion for continuance has been filed." R. at 436. The 
evidence in the record, however, was undisputed that the entities in question were 
3
 While questioning its scope, the Supreme Court's recent decision - Dansie v. City 
ofHerriman, 2006 UT 23, f 15, 134 P.3d 1139, 1144-45 (Utah 2006) - does not 
negate the holding of Aurora Credit. 
15 
closely held, and all the key parties were before the court, such that a multiplicity 
of actions or unfair distribution of a recovery were not issues. Further, a court 
should not place the burden on the limited partner or minority shareholder to prove 
that none of the exceptions cited in the PRINCIPLES apply. The general partner -
given his or its control over the partnership - should be required to demonstrate 
that an exception - e.g., prejudice to creditors - requires the claim to be pursued 
derivatively, rather than directly. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in Aurora Credit that "the rationale for 
requiring an action to proceed derivatively is often absent in a closely-held 
corporation, where it is unlikely that there is a disinterested board because the 
majority shareholders are often the corporation's managers." 970 P.2d at 1280. 
Other courts have allowed derivative claims to be brought directly by a shareholder 
or limited partner by drawing a comparison between the closely-held corporation 
and a partnership: 
Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close 
corporation to the partnership, the trust and confidence 
which are essential to this scale and manner of enterprise, 
and the inherent danger to minority interests in the close 
corporation, we hold that stockholders in the close 
corporation owe one another substantially the same 
fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that 
partners owe to one another. 
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass. 578, 592-93, 328 
N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975). 
16 
This comparison is particularly applicable to a closely-held limited 
partnership like the ones at issue here. Both CL Mgmt and CLP are closely-held 
limited partnerships. GLFP alleged that the Clarks, as managing general partners 
of both entities, acted for their own benefit (and that of the Clark family) and to 
the detriment of GLFP (and the Learnings). As managing general partners, the 
Clarks were the equivalent of controlling shareholders in a close corporation, i.e., it 
would have been the Clarks' decision as to whether CLP would bring any action 
for derivative harm. Accordingly, requiring that a damage claim be brought in the 
name of CLP places GLFP in an untenable position and exalts form over 
substance. Therefore, even if the district court were correct in classifying all the 
asserted claims as derivative, it should have permitted GLFP to pursue these claims 
under established Utah law. SeeArndt, 991 P.2d at 589. See also Simon v. Mann, 
373 F. Supp. 1196, 1198-1200 (D. Nev. 2005) (discussing rationale for close-
corporation exception for bringing derivative claims). 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO AMEND. 
In light of the district court's determination that the asserted claims were 
derivative, GLFP moved to amend its Complaint to comply with the court's 
decision. Specifically, GLFP sought leave to allege that it was entitled to pursue 
the derivative claims consistent with § 48-2a-1003, which provides: 
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In a derivative action, the complaint shall set forth with 
particularity the effort of the plaintiff to secure initiation 
of the action by a general partner or the reasons for not 
making the effort. 
This statute effectively recognizes the "futility of demand" exception to 
bringing derivative claims in the name of the limited partnership when the general 
partner controlling the partnership has a conflict in asserting those claims. Here, 
GLFP's Complaint, on its face, showed that the Clarks had a conflict because their 
conduct (both individually and through CL Mgmt) was the basis for the asserted 
claims. R. at 3-5. These allegations were sufficient to establish futility of demand. 
See 13 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5965 at 87 (2004) ("if the plaintiff 
pleads sufficient facts to create a reasonable doubt that the directors are 
disinterested or independent, futility of demand has been established . . . . ) ; id. at 
74-75 ("Courts have generally excused demand if it would be directed to 
individuals who, by reason of hostile interest or participation in the alleged 
wrongdoing, cannot be expected to institute litigation on behalf of the 
corporation."). 
GLFP's motion to amend noted that Mr. Clark had acknowledged the 
conflict by offering to "involve respected third party experts for assessment of the 
merits of any purported derivative claims." R. at 440. Nothing in the case law 
supports a requirement that a limited partner must agree to have a third party 
evaluate derivative claims when the general partner has a conflict. To the contrary, 
18 
the Utah statute recognizes that a limited partner may bring the action and assert 
the derivative claim when it is futile to request the general partner to do so. Cf. 
Peller v. Southern Co., 911 F.2d 1532, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (in appointing special 
committee to evaluate claim, board of directors conceded its conflict and therefore 
demand was excused). 
The district court failed to address the merits of the motion to amend. 
Instead, the district court erroneously concluded that, because it had denied the 
motion for reconsideration regarding the dissolution claim, the motion to amend 
was moot. R. at 576. No rationale was offered for this conclusion, which was 
clearly erroneous. GLFP in no way linked the motion for reconsideration with the 
motion to amend. In fact, the whole basis for the motion to amend was the district 
court's determination that the asserted claims were derivative in nature. R. at 440. 
In that respect, denial of the motion to reconsider buttressed the motion to amend, 
rather than rendered it moot. The motion to amend, in seeking to assert derivative 
claims, could not have been moot when the district court reiterated its conclusion 
that all the claims at issue were derivative. The district court's finding of mootness 
is a non sequitur. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, GLFP (and the Learnings) had facially valid complaints 
regarding the actions of Defendants, whether labeled derivative or otherwise. The 
19 
district court's decision requires minority shareholders or limited partners, such as 
GLFP, to present claims to the alleged wrongdoers for consideration and action. 
This perverse outcome should be rejected. 
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully requests that the district court's summary 
judgment be reversed and this matter be remanded for full discovery and trial on 
the merits. 
Dated this 7th day of September, 2006. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Brent E. Johnson, 7558 
Katherine Norman, 9573 
Holland & Hart LLP 
A. Biruce Jones, #11370 
Holland & Hart LLP 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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Addendum 
Exhibit 1 
CL MANAGEMENT, LTD. 
GENERAL PARTNERS: 
Howard Clark- 10% 
MB Management, Inc. 
LIMITED PARTNERS: 
GLFP - 47% 
HCFP- 39% 
GL Marital Trust 
2% 
2% 
Assets: 
No real property 
CLARK LEAMING 
INVESTMENT CO. 
GENERAL PARTNER: 
CL Management-2% 
LIMITED PARTNERS: 
HCFP- 45% 
J, Learning Trust - 22.5% 
S. Pollish-22.5% 
Assets: 
Have been sold 
MODULUS 
INVESTMENT Co. 
GENERAL PARTNERS: 
CL Management - 2% 
Woodbury Trust - 1% 
G. Richard Young - 1% 
LIMITED PARTNERS: 
HCFP - 24% 
Woodbury Trust - 24% 
Riuchard Young - 24% 
J. Learning Trust - 12% 
S. Pollish- 12% 
Assets: 
Have been sold 
CLARK LEAM ING 
PROPERTIES 
GENERAL PARTNER: 
CL Management - 10% 
LIMITED PARTNERS: 
HCFP - 4 5 % 
GLFP - 45% 
Assets: 
Phoenix (land and building) 
Sacramento (building only) 
Santa Monica (building only) 
Montcry (building only) 
CLARK LEAMING, INC. 
Merline Leaming - 50% 
Howard Clark-14% 
Betty Clark-36% 
Exhibit 2 
CLARK LEAMING 
INVESTMENT C O . 
CLARK 
LEAMING 
PROPERTIES 
MODULUS 
INVESTMENT 
Co. 
FEES 
Pass through, less expenses for 
Clark/Leaming entities 
GEORGE LEAMING 
FAMILY PARTNERSHIP 
("GLFP") 
Direct harm to GLFP 
from reduced or non-
exisent distributions 
Exhibit 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
^ H Q V - 7 2005 
DepuMClerk 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 050902498 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
November 3, 2005 
GLFP, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
CL MANAGEMENT, LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership; CLARK 
LEAMING PROPERTIES, LTD., a 
Utah limited partnership; and 
HOWARD S. CLARK and H SCOTT 
CLARK, individuals, 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Assignments and 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Derivative Claims. 
The Court heard oral argument with respect to the motions on 
October 31, 2005. Following the hearing, the matters were taken 
under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
Turning initially to the motion regarding assignments, 
Defendants assert it has now been established that GLFP in 2002 
assigned, entirely, its limited partner interests in CL 
GLFP v. CL MANAGEMENT Page 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Management and Clark Learning Properties, Ltd., to the wholly 
separate parties of Sumerlea, Ltd. and Ming, Ltd. Given these 
assignments, it is Defendants' position GLFP has no standing to 
pursue any of the claims set forth in the Complaint. Thus, 
contend Defendants, CL Management is entitled to summary judgment 
on all claims. 
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing Merline and Jan Learning 
vigorously assert that no assignment ever took place.1 
Moreover, asserts Plaintiff, the evidence shows that the Consent 
documents were never fully executed and the Consents were 
intended as consents to assignments that were never consummated. 
Indeed, contends Plaintiff, one of the alleged assignees, Ming, 
was never formed. Furthermore, the Consent documents were never 
delivered to Plaintiff, as required for valid acceptance. 
Even if the Consents were otherwise valid as assignments, it 
is Plaintiff's position Defendants should be estopped to rely 
upon them because of their inequitable action in concealing the 
executed Consent documents from Plaintiff while extracting 
continued cash calls and fees from Plaintiff. 
Merline contends that as part of her estate planning, she 
contemplated using two partnerships to divide the assets among 
her daughters. Ming with her daughter Jan and Sumerlea with her 
daughter Susan. Plaintiff, however, contends said plans were 
ultimately abandoned. 
GLFP v. CL MANAGEMENT Page 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
After reviewing the record in this matter, the Court finds 
disputed issues of fact with respect to whether the Consents were 
properly executed and whether or not delivery of any acceptance 
of consent occurred, preclude summary judgment on this basis at 
this time. 
Turning next to the motion regarding derivative claims, 
Defendants argue Plaintiff is seeking to assert, directly, claims 
that are as a matter of law, derivative. Indeed, contend 
Defendants, Plaintiff in its Complaint and discovery responses 
identifies two factual theories that allegedly support all of its 
claims. These theories, assert Defendants, are that Defendant CL 
Management, as the general partner, (1) mismanaged certain real 
property holdings owned by Clark Learning Properties Ltd.; and (2) 
charged improper and illegal fees to Clark Learning Properties, 
Ltd. Both of these theories, contend Defendants, are derivative 
and can only support derivative claims for relief. 
The aforementioned in mind, it is Defendants' position 
Plaintiff failed to comply with Utah law regarding the assertion 
of derivative claims. For example, Plaintiff has not set forth 
any efforts made to secure the action desired from the general 
partner, the reasons the effort failed, or why they chose not to 
make the effort. 
In light of the forgoing, Defendants seek summary judgment 
GLFP v. CL MANAGEMENT Page 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
on the theories noted above, as well as Plaintiff's attempted 
direct claim for breach of any fiduciary duties and such related 
damage theories. 
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing its claims are not 
derivative, rather, such are for injuries directly suffered by 
GLFP. Indeed, contends Plaintiff, its claim is that the harm to 
GLFP is direct in that, contrary to the Clarks' representations, 
the excessive fees do not equally benefit the Clarks and GLFP-via 
distributions from CL Management. Rather, contends Plaintiff, 
the Clarks have used the improper fees to help fund their own 
interests to the detriment of Plaintiff and derivatively to the 
Learnings.2 In other words, asserts Plaintiff, because of CL's 
involvement with entities that benefit the Clarks alone, the 
Learnings have been paying a disproportionate share of expenses 
and receiving less in distributions, thereby effectively 
subsidizing the management of properties from which they derive 
no benefit.3 
2As background, Defendant Clark Learning Properties ("CLP") 
is a Utah Limited Partnership. CL Management ("CL") is a Utah 
Limited partnership and Defendant Howard Clark is the Managing 
Partner of CL. CL is the Managing General Partner of CLP. CL 
Owns 10% of CLP. The remaining 90% of CLP is owned equally by 
the Learning family through Plaintiff GLFP (short for George 
Learning Family Partnership) and the Clarks, through an entity 
called HCFP (short for the Howard Clark Family Partnership). 
3In the Complaint Plaintiff states " . . . the Clarks have 
commingled the activities of numerous properties and interests-in 
GLFP v. CL MANAGEMENT Page 5 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Indeed, to the extent any of GLFP'S claims could be deemed 
derivative, it is Plaintiff's position Utah law permits such 
claims under circumstances such as this, where the shareholders 
are part of a closely held corporation. 
After, again, reviewing the record in this matter, the Court 
agrees that GLFP is seeking to assert, directly, claims that are, 
as a matter of law, derivative. Indeed, although GLFP may 
ultimately experience the indirect effect of the alleged 
wrongdoing, the undisputed evidence indicates that the only 
direct claims are held by the Partnership. Moreover, since this 
action has not been brought as a derivative one, Plaintiff's 
claims with respect to an accounting and for dissolution lack any 
basis. Finally, although Plaintiff argued it should be excepted 
from the derivative requirement, given the closely held nature of 
corporation, the evidence in the record simply does not support 
such an exception and, further, no proper Rule 56(f) motion for 
continuance has been filed. 
Based upon the forgoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment Re: Derivative Claims is granted. 
which the Learnings have no ownership but the Clarks do-with the 
business of CL Management. In doing so, the Clarks have used the 
improper fees to help fund their own interests, to the detriment 
of Plaintiff and, derivatively, to the Learnings." Complaint at 
13. 
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DATED thi ..2 day of November, 2005, 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLFP ltd., a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CL MANAGEMENT, LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership; CLARK 
LEAMING PROPERTIES, LTD., a 
Utah limited partnership; and 
HOWARD S. CLARK and H. SCOTT 
CLARK, individuals, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 050902498 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
April 5, 2006 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff's Motion to 
Amend, Defendant's Motion to Strike and Defendant's Motion for 
Entry of Judgment, submitted for decision on March 23, 2006. 
Although oral argument was requested, the Court is not persuaded 
such would be of assistance in this matter, nor is a hearing 
required by the applicable Rules. Accordingly, the ruling with 
respect to the motions will be addressed in the following Minute 
Entry. 
Turning to the merits of the motions, after reviewing the 
record in this matter and although a claim for dissolution is not 
typically derivative, it is clear GLFP's claim is based upon the 
premise that CL Management, as general partner, charged and 
collected improper fees from Clark Learning Properties, Ltd. No 
independent and direct basis for recovery has been alleged by 
GLFP. Accordingly, while characterized as a dissolution claim, 
the Complaint, nonetheless, is founded upon a derivative theory 
of recovery (fee mismanagement). 
Based upon the forgoing, Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration is, respectfully, denied. Accordingly, 
<rrc 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and Defendant's Motion to Strike are 
moot. The Court will execute the submitted Order and Judgment. 
DATED this r day of April, 2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
e for case 050902498 by the method and on the date 
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Mail A BRUCE JONES 
ATTORNEY PLA 
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial-District 
Jeffery S. Williams (6054) 
NELSON CHRISTENSEN & HELSTEN 
68 South Main Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-8400 
Facsimile: (801) 363-3614 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLFP, LTD., a Former Utah limited 
partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CL MANAGEMENT, LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership; CLARK LEAMING 
PROPERTIES, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership; and HOWARD S. CLARK 
and H. SCOTT CLARK, individuals, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT REGARDING DERIVATIVE 
CLAIMS AND DENYING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT REGARDING 
ASSIGNMENTS 
Civil No.: 050902498 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The defendants CL Management, Ltd, Clark Learning Properties, Ltd, Howard S. Clark 
and H. Scott Clark filed two motions for summary judgment, which came before the Court for 
hearing on October 31, 2005. These motions were fully briefed, and extensive argument was 
offered to the Court. At the hearing, the defendants were represented by Mr. Jeffery Williams, 
and the plaintiff GLFP, Ltd was represented by Mr. Bruce Jones and Ms. Katherine Norman. 
APR - 5 2006 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By _ _ . 
Deputy Clerk 
Having considered the arguments of counsel and the briefing previously provided to the 
Court, the Court hereby Orders as follows: 
1. The Court denies the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the 
contested assignments between the plaintiff and the third party entities of Ming, Ltd and 
Sumerlea, Ltd. The grounds for denying this motion for summary judgment are set forth in the 
Court's memorandum decision dated November 7, 2005. 
2. The Court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the 
existence of only derivative claims asserted in the plaintiffs complaint. The grounds for granting 
this motion for summary judgment are set forth in the Court's memorandum decision dated 
November 7, 2005. A judgment consistent with this portion of the Order was entered by the 
Court. 
DATED this '_ day of ^  , 2 0 Q ^ 
BY THE* 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING DERIVATIVE CLAIMS AND DENYING . 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING ASSIGNMENTS was served in the manner 
/ / , i> indicated below this <_f_ day of November, 2005, upon: 
Brent E. Johnson 
Katherine Norman 
Holland & Hart, LLP 
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1031 
A. Bruce Jones 
Patricia Dean 
Holland & Hart, LLP 
555 17th Street, Suite 3200 
P.O.Box 8749 
Denver, CO 80201-8749 
(VIA HAND-DELIVERY) 
(VIA U.S. MAIL) 
Jeffery S. Williams (6054) 
NELSON CHRISTENSEN & HELSTEN 
68 South Main Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-8400 
Facsimile: (801) 363-3614 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLFP, LTD., a Former Utah limited 
partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CL MANAGEMENT, LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership; CLARK LEAMING 
PROPERTIES, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership; and HOWARD S. CLARK 
and H. SCOTT CLARK, individuals, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 050902498 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The Court, pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby enters 
judgment in this matter based on the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants. 
The Court finds that all of the claims set forth in plaintiffs complaint are derivative 
claims, and/or are premised on derivative claims for relief. Thus, the Court accordingly directs 
judgment in favor of the defendants, in that the plaintiff has improperly asserted such claims 
FILED BISTRJGT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
STf\ 
directly and in violation of Utah statutory law. See Utah Code Ann. §§48-2a-1001 through 1006, 
and Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah. 991 P.2d 584 (Utah 1999). The grounds and rationale 
supporting this judgment are set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision dated November 7, 
2005. 
This judgment does not preclude the plaintiff from pursuing proper derivative 
proceedings consistent with the requirements of Utah law, and to the extent such proceedings are 
otherwise appropriate. 
Pursuant to Rules 54(d) and 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, fees and/or costs in 
the amount of $ are awarded to the defendants. 
DATED this _ 1 _ day of ^Tlfit t*L 20G£^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT 
was served in the manner indicated below this ' ? day of November, 2005, upon: 
Brent E. Johnson (VIA HAND-DELIVERY) 
{Catherine Norman 
Holland & Hart, LLP 
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1031 
A. Bruce Jones (VIA U.S. MAIL) 
Patricia Dean 
Holland & Hart, LLP 
555 17th Street, Suite 3200 
P.O.Box 8749 
Denver, CO 80201-8749 
